The required publicity in the use of alias is more than mere communication to a third person; the use of the alias, to be considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to cause it to become generally known

Facts: In 2001, an Information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal use of alias was likewise filed against Estrada. The information in the latter case read:

"That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then President of the Republic of the Philippines, without having been duly authorized, judicially or administratively, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to office, i.e., in order to CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED during his tenure and his true identity as THE President of the Republic of the Philippines, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS JOSE VELARDE IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias Jose Velarde which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

The two cases were consolidated for joint trial. 

After the People rested, the defense moved to be allowed to file a demurrer to evidence in these cases, which the Sandiganbayan granted.

The demurrer to evidence for illegal use of alias was anchored on the following grounds:

 

1. Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the prosecution, only two (2) witnesses, Ms. Clarissa Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato, testified that on one occasion (4 February 2000), they saw movant use the name Jose Velarde;

 

2. The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal and was prohibited only in late 2001 as can be gleaned from Bangko Sentral Circular No. 302, series of 2001, dated 11 October 2001;

 

3.  There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as the documents offered by the prosecution are banking documents which, by their nature, are confidential and cannot be revealed without following proper procedures; and

 

4.  The use of alias is absorbed in plunder.

The Sandiganbayan issued a joint resolution granting Estrada's demurrer to evidence. The Sandiganbayan found that the People failed to present evidence that Estrada committed the crime punished under Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act No. 6085, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ursua v. Court of Appeals. It ruled that there is an illegal use of alias within the context of CA 142 only if the use of the alias is public and habitual.

Issue: Was the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias Jose Velarde public?

Held: The Supreme Court, citing the earlier case of Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, defined an “alias” as:

a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. There must be, in the words of Ursua, a sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name (the alias) in addition to his real name from that day forth [for the use of alias to] fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.

The required publicity in the use of alias is more than mere communication to a third person; the use of the alias, to be considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to cause it to become generally known. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that other name. In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest.

To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public who had no access to Estradas privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired in Malacaan where he sat as President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at that time. The same holds true for Estradas alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of Estradas representations to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.

The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests, affords Estrada a reasonable expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act related to the opening of a trust account a transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely confidential in nature.

Bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy. Given the private nature of Estradas act of signing the documents as Jose Velarde related to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim that there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. We need not even consider here the impact of the obligations imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the bank officers; what is essentially significant is the privacy situation that is necessarily implied in these kinds of transactions. This statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction was done publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly." (People vs Estrada, G.R. Nos. 164368-69, April 2, 2009)

An alias is a name that is different from the individual’s true name, and does not refer to a name that is not different from his true name

Facts: Limson filed a case for falsification against Eugenio Juan Gonzalez. Limson asserted that in the records of the Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC), a certain ‘EUGENIO GONZALEZ’ is registered as an architect and that Gonzalez, who uses, among others, the name ‘EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ’, pretends to be said architect. Gonzalez is an impostor and therefore, guilty of falsification. 

Gonzalez filed his Counter–Affidavit, wherein he explained in detail that his full name is EUGENIO JUAN GONZALES y REGALADO. He alleges that in grade school and high school, he used the name EUGENIO GONZALEZ y REGALADO and/or EUGENIO GONZALEZ but when he transferred to the University of Sto. Tomas and took up Architecture, he made use of his second name, JUAN after EUGENIO. After he passed the board exam, he made use as much as possible the name Arch. Eugenio Juan Gonzalez, because the surname GONZALEZ was and is still, a very common surname throughout the Philippines and he wanted to distinguish himself.

After weighing the evidence, the investigating prosecutor dismissed the case. Limson appealed to the Secretary of Justice who affirmed the findings of the prosecutor.

Limson then filed a new letter complaint against Gonzalez with the Secretary of Justice, alleging the same accusations, this time for violation of the Anti-Alias Law. The DOJ referred to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City and docketed as a new case. Even so, the Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the new case. 

When her case met the same fate, Limson again filed a petition for review with the DOJ, which again denied her petition. The CA affirmed the decision of the DOJ.

In her petition for review on certiorari filed with the Supreme Court, Limson insists that the names “Eugenio Gonzalez” and “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado” did not refer to one and the same individual; and that respondent Gonzalez was not a registered architect contrary to his claim. According to her, there were material discrepancies between the graduation photograph of respondent taken in 1941 when he earned his degree in Architecture from the University of Sto. Tomas, Manila, and another photograph of him taken for his driver’s license in 1996, arguing that the person in the latter photograph was not the same individual depicted in the 1941 photograph. She submits documents showing that respondent used aliases from birth, and passed himself off as such persons when in fact he was not.

Held: The Supreme Court held that it is not a trier of facts, and cannot analyze and weigh evidence.

It also held that Limson did not persuasively demonstrate to the CA how the Secretary of Justice had been gravely wrong in upholding the dismissal by the OCP of her charges against respondent. In contrast, the assailed resolutions of the Secretary of Justice were quite exhaustive in their exposition of the reasons for the dismissal of the charges. And, even assuming that the Secretary of Justice thereby erred, she should have shown to the CA that either arbitrariness or capriciousness or whimsicality had tainted the error. Yet, she tendered no such showing. She should be reminded, indeed, that grave abuse of discretion meant either that the judicial or quasi–judicial power was exercised by the Secretary of Justice in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the Secretary of Justice evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when the Secretary of Justice, while exercising judicial or quasi–judicial powers, acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

On the issue of the alleged use of illegal aliases, the court held that respondent’s aliases involved the names “Eugenio Gonzalez”, “Eugenio Gonzales”, “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez”, “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado”, “Eugenio C.R. Gonzalez”, “Eugenio J. Gonzalez”, and – per Limson – “Eugenio Juan Robles Gonzalez.” But these names contained his true names, albeit at times joined with an erroneous middle or second name, or a misspelled family name in one instance. The records disclose that the erroneous middle or second names, or the misspelling of the family name resulted from error or inadvertence left unchecked and unrectified over time. What is significant, however, is that such names were not fictitious names within the purview of the Anti–Alias Law; and that such names were not different from each other. Considering that he was not also shown to have used the names for unscrupulous purposes, or to deceive or confuse the public, the dismissal of the charge against him was justified in fact and in law.

An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually, usually in business transactions, in addition to the real name by which he was registered at birth or baptized the first time, or to the substitute name authorized by a competent authority; a man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him, but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. An alias is thus a name that is different from the individual’s true name, and does not refer to a name that is not different from his true name." (Limson vs. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 162205, March 31, 2014)

Use of fictitious name in a single transaction without intending to be known by this name in addition to his real name, not a violation of anti-alias law

Facts:

In 1989, Cesario Ursua was charged with bribery. His lawyer asked him to get a copy of the complaint against him from the Office of the Ombudsman since the law firm’s messenger, a certain Oscar Perez, was not available. 

Before going to the Ombudsman, Ursua talked to Perez and told him that he is reluctant to ask for a copy of the complaint because he is the respondent in the said case. Perez then told him than he can just sign as “Oscar Perez” so that he does not have to reveal his true identity.

At the Office of the Ombudsman, Ursua signed the logbook there as “Oscar Perez”. When he was handed a copy of the complaint by Loida Kahulugan, he signed the receipt as “Oscar Perez”. 

Before he could leave the premises, Ursua was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo who also works in the same office. When Loida learned that he was in fact Cesario Ursua, she recommended that a criminal case be filed against Ursua. Eventually, Ursua was sentenced to three years in prison for violating C.A. No. 142, as amended, otherwise known as “An Act To Regulate The Use Of Aliases”.

Issue: Was Cesario Ursua’s conviction proper?

Held: No. Ursua should be acquitted. 

"An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A mans name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. 

It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as Oscar Perez, which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that Oscar Perez is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name Oscar Perez was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.

While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. 

Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers."(Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112170, April 10, 1996)

Note: In short, the evils sought to be avoided by the C.A. No. 142 was not brought about when Ursua used a name other than his name. A strict application of the law is not warranted. When Ursua used the name of Oscar Perez, no fraud was committed; there was no crime committed punishable under C.A. No. 142. The purpose of the law is to punish evils defined therein so when no such evil was produced by Ursua’s act, said law need not be applied. - http://www.uberdigests.info

Purpose of the Anti-Alias Law

Purpose is to prevent confusion and fraud in business transaction.

The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934. The enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register. (Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112170, April 10, 1996)

Alias, defined

An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. (Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112170, April 10, 1996)

The failure to allege accurately the relationship between the appellant and his victim bars his conviction in the qualified form

The failure to allege accurately the relationship between the appellant and his victim bars his conviction in the qualified form.

Facts: 

Poñado is charged with three counts of rape under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659. In all three informations the victim, 13-year old Mariner Bombales, has been stated to be the stepdaughter of the accused; yet, the evidence show that Reynaldo Poñado is but a "live-in partner" of the victim's mother, the latter being, in fact, lawfully married to one Marcelino Bombales. The trial court convicted the accused of the crime of qualified rape and sentenced him to the penalty of death.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused should be convicted of qualified rape.

Held: 

The accused should not be convicted of qualified rape. In qualified rape, both the fact of minority of the victim and the actual relationship between the parties must be alleged in the information. Unlike a generic aggravating circumstance, a qualifying aggravating cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the information.

In the case at bar, the failure to allege accurately the relationship between the appellant and his victim bars his conviction in the qualified form that is punishable by death. The technical flaw is a matter that cannot be ignored. It constrains the Court to reduce the penalty of death imposed by the trial court to that of reclusion perpetua. [People of the Philippines vs. Reynaldo Poñado, G.R. No. 131334, July 28, 1999 - En Banc Vitug, J.]

Note: The Information should have stated that the accused is the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. 

Both minority and relationship of the minor to the offender must be alleged in the Information before an accused can be convicted of qualified rape

Where victim is a minor and related to the offender, both facts must be alleged in the Information before an accused can be convicted of qualified rape

Facts: 

Demetrio Nuñez was charged with raping his 14-year old daughter. However, the minority of the victim is not stated in the Information. What was alleged therein was only the relationship of the offended party as the daughter of the offender. The trial court convicted Nuñez with the crime of qualified rape, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death.

Issue:

Whether or not Nuñez could be convicted of the crime of qualified rape.

Held: 

Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1.  When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, x x x. Jurisprudence dictates that these twin facts be alleged in the Information or Complaint before the death penalty can properly be imposed. Indeed, this Court has consistently held that the seven attendant circumstances under Section 11 of RA 7659 are in the nature of qualifying circumstances which, unlike generic aggravating circumstances that may be proved even if not alleged, cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the Information. Thus, there being no allegation of minority in the Information under which accused was arraigned and tried in the case at bench, he cannot be convicted of qualified rape.

Penalty of Nuñez was reduced to reclusion perpetua. [People vs. Nuñez, G.R. No. 128875, 08 July 1999]