An extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible against his or her co-accused; exception

An extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible against his or her co-accused; exception

Facts: Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his 8-year-old daughter were shot and killed in 2003. The police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit wherein he stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by Lloyd Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo.

Columna was arrested. On March 8, 2004, he executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his participation as "look out" during the shooting and implicated Romulo Awingan as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, Lloyd Antiporda, ex-mayor and mayor, respectively, of Buguey, Cagayan.

Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint against those implicated by Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Columna affirmed his affidavit before the investigating prosecutor. During the preliminary investigation, Licerio presented Columna’s handwritten letter wherein the latter disowned the contents of his earlier affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. He stated that those he implicated had no participation in the killings.

The investigating prosecutor set a clarificatory hearing. During the hearing, Columna categorically admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. Thus, the investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges. In another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor, Columna said that he was only forced to withdraw all his statements against respondents during the clarificatory hearing because of the threats to his life inside the jail.

The RTC judge Daguna denied the motion to withdraw the informations and held that based on the affidavit which Columna affirmed before the investigating prosecutor, there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial. CA reversed the decision. Tamargo appealed.

Petitioner argues that, based on the independent assessment of the Judge Daguna, there was probable cause based on the earlier affidavit of Columna. She considered all the pieces of evidence but did not give credit to Columna’s recantation.

Awingan and the Antiporda's, on the other hand, contend that Columna’s extrajudicial confession was inadmissible against them because of the rule on res inter alios acta.

Held: Judge Daguna failed to consider that Columna’s extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios acta.

Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them. The reason for this rule is that:

on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.

An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.

Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them. [Harold V. Tamargo vs Romulo Awingan, et al., G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010]

Extrajudicial confession before barangay tanods and barangay chairman is inadmissible in evidence

Barangay tanods including the barangay chairman may be deemed law enforcement officers; extra-judicial confession before them is inadmissible.

Facts: Appellant Edna Malngan was convicted with arson. On appeal, she questioned the admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbor of the private complainant.

Held: Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution in part provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

x x x x

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this Section or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence.

To be admissible in evidence against an accused, the extrajudicial confessions made must satisfy the following requirements:

1. it must be voluntary;
2. it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
3. it must be express; and
4. it must be in writing.

Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses as well as killed the whole family of Roberto Separa, Sr.  She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1), of the Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellant’s confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo was made in response to the “interrogation” made by the latter – admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter found by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her as such were obtained in violation of her constitutional rights.

Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused-appellant’s confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo and the lighter as evidence do not automatically lead to her acquittal. It should well be recalled that the constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits to having committed the offense as what happened in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of Roberto Separa, Sr., to having started the fire in the Separas’ house.  The testimony of Mercedita Mendoza recounting said admission is, unfortunately for accused-appellant, admissible in evidence against her and is not covered by the aforesaid constitutional guarantee. Article III of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely governs the relationship between the individual on one hand and the State (and its agents) on the other; it does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another private individual – as both accused-appellant and prosecution witness Mercedita Mendoza undoubtedly are. Here, there is no evidence on record to show that said witness was acting under police authority, so appropriately, accused-appellant’s uncounselled extrajudicial confession to said witness was properly admitted by the RTC. [People of the Philippines vs Edna Malngan, G. R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006]

Extrajudicial confession before a barangay captain who is also a lawyer is inadmissible in evidence.

Extrajudicial confession before a barangay captain who is also a lawyer is an uncounselled confession and therefore, inadmissible in evidence. 

Facts: Appellant Elizar Tomaquin was convicted with murder. There were no eyewitnesses to the incident, and the prosecution’s evidence, aside from appellant’s extrajudicial confession, was mainly circumstantial. Said extrajudicial confession was given in the presence of Atty. Parawan, a barangay captain who is also a lawyer. Tomaquin questions the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession because it was an uncounselled confession. Tomaquin contends that the barangay captain, although a lawyer, may not be considered an independent counsel within the purview of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Held: Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. 

The words “competent and independent counsel” in the constitutional provision is not an empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer.

A barangay captain is called upon to enforce the law and ordinances in his barangay and ensure peace and order at all times.

In fact, a barangay captain is deemed a person in authority under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. – Who shall be deemed as such. – In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or government corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority. 

On these bases, it is not legally possible to consider the barangay captain as an independent counsel of appellant.

In this case the role of the barangay captain, was a peacekeeping officer of his barangay and therefore in direct conflict with the role of providing competent legal assistance to appellant who was accused of committing a crime in his jurisdiction, the barangay captain could not be considered as an independent counsel of appellant, when the latter executed his extrajudicial confession. What the Constitution requires is the presence of an independent and competent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client’s defense without any intervening conflict of interest.

Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify as a competent counsel, i.e., an effective and vigilant counsel. An “effective and vigilant counsel” necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.  As held in People vs. Velarde:

. . .  The competent and independent lawyer so engaged should be present at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.

[People of the Philippines vs Elizar Tomaquin, G.R. No. 133188, July 23, 2004]

Court has the sound discretion to determine whether a witness will be permitted to testify in a narrative form

It is within the sound discretion of the trial judge to determine whether a witness will be permitted to testify in a narrative form.

Facts: Appellant Calixtro was convicted of the crime of rape. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in allowing the complainant-witness to testify in narrative form.

Held: Usually in criminal cases, the material facts within the knowledge of a witness are elicited by questions put to him by the counsel calling him. By this means, the evidence is readily limited and confined within the issue for the reason that the relevancy of the answer can in most cases be ascertained from the character of the question (Underhill's Criminal Evidence, Sec. 387, p. 742). While this is the general rule, it still rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge to determine whether a witness will be required to testify by question and answer, or will be permitted to testify in a narrative form (98 C.J.S., Sec. 325, p. 26). There is no legal principle which prevents a witness from giving his testimony in a narrative form if he is requested to do so by counsel. A witness may be allowed to testify by narration if it would be the best way of getting at what he knew or could state concerning the matter at issue. It would expedite the trial and would perhaps furnish the court a clearer understanding of the matters related as they occurred. Moreover, narrative testimony may be allowed if material parts of his evidence cannot be easily obtained through piecemeal testimonies. But if, in giving such testimony, the witness states matters irrelevant or immaterial or incompetent, it is the right and duty of counsel objecting to such testimony to interpose and arrest the narration by calling the attention of the court particularly to the objectionable matter and, by a motion to strike it out, obtain a ruling of the court excluding such testimony from the case (98 C.J.S., Ibid.). While a witness may be permitted in the discretion of the court to narrate his knowledge of material facts bearing upon the case without specifically being interrogated in detail, it is also within the discretion of the court to prohibit a witness from volunteering unsought information in connection with the case (5 Jones on Evidence, Sec. 2312). [People of the Philippines vs Pedring Calixtro, G.R. No. 92355, January 24, 1991]