Before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction

Before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction.

Facts: Ombudsman Desierto ordered Lourdes T. Marquez, branch manager of Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at said branch which are involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman entitled "Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau vs Amado Lagdameo, et. al." Marquez filed a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and injuction against the Ombudsman, seeking a definite ruling as regards her rights under RA 1405 and the power of OMB to inspect bank deposit under Sec. 15 of RA 6770. She also prayed for a TRO because the Ombudsman and other persons acting under his authority were continuously harassing her to produce the bank documents under threat of being held in indirect contempt. The prayer for TRO was denied by the trial court.

Held: Before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case. In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is existing is an investigation by the office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the Office of the Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection. [Lourdes T. Marquez vs. Hon. Aniano A. Desierto, G.R. No. 135882, June 27, 2001]

The Bank Secrecy Law does not preclude the bank deposits from being garnished to satisfy a judgment

The prohibition against an examination of or inquiry into bank deposits  under R.A. 1405 does not preclude garnishment in satisfaction of a judgment.

Facts: Liong, cashier of China Banking Corporation, was ordered to inform the Court whether or not there is a deposit in the China Banking Corporation of defendant B&B Forest Development Corporation (BBFDC), and if there is any deposit, to hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from the Court. Liong and China Banking Corporation refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of BBFDC by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 (Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) which allegedly prohibits the disclosure of any information concerning to bank deposits.

Held: The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into deposit of B&B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the defendant B&B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for the purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order. It was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment. It is clear from the discussion of the conference committee report that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into bank deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case, and the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. It is hard to conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient of converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank. [China Banking Corporation and Tan Kim Liong vs. Hon. Wenceslao Ortega et. al, G.R. No. L-34964, 31 January 1973]

Anti-Graft Law provides additional exception to the rule against the disclosure of bank deposits

Section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is intended to amend Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 by providing an additional exception to the rule against the disclosure of bank deposits.

Facts: DOJ special prosecutors Emilio Gancayco and Florentino Flor required Philippine National Bank to produce at a hearing the records of the bank deposits of Ernesto Jimenez, former administrator of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Administration, who was then under investigation for unexplained wealth. PNB declined to reveal its records, invoking Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405.

Gancayco and Flor cited Section 8 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) in support of their claim of authority and demanded anew that Eduardo Z. Romualdez, as bank president, produce the records or he would be prosecuted for contempt. Romualdez and PNB thus filed an action for declaratory judgment. After trial, the court rendered judgment, sustaining the power of the defendants to compel the disclosure of bank accounts of Jimenez. The court said that, by enacting section 8 of, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Congress clearly intended to provide an additional ground for the examination of bank deposits for without such provision, prosecutors would be hampered if not altogether frustrated in the prosecution of those charged with having acquired unexplained wealth while in public office. Romualdez and PNB appealed.

Held: While Republic Act No. 1405 provides that bank deposits are "absolutely confidential ... and [therefore] may not be examined, inquired or looked into," except in those cases enumerated therein, the Anti-Graft Law directs in mandatory terms that bank deposits "shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary." The only conclusion possible is that section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is intended to amend section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 by providing additional exception to the rule against the disclosure of bank deposits.

With regard to the claim that disclosure would be contrary to the policy making bank deposits confidential, it is enough to point out that while section 2 of Republic Act 1405 declares bank deposits to be "absolutely confidential, "it nevertheless allows such disclosure in the following instances: (1) Upon written permission of the depositor; (2) In cases of impeachment; (3) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; (4) In cases where the money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation. Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from the policy as to the other. This policy express the motion that a public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny. [National Bank and Eduardo Z. Romualdez vs. Emilio Gancayco and Florentino Flor, G.R. No. L-18343, September 30, 1965]