Three-day notice rule, not a hard and fast rule

Although this issue has been obviated by our disposition of the two main issues, the Court would like to point out that the three-day notice requirement is not a hard and fast rule and substantial compliance is allowed.

Pertinently, Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court reads:

 Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to insure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. [Emphasis supplied]

The law is clear that it intends for the other party to receive a copy of the written motion at least three days before the date set for its hearing. The purpose of the three (3)-day notice requirement, which was established not for the benefit of the movant but rather for the adverse party, is to avoid surprises upon the latter and to grant it sufficient time to study the motion and to enable it to meet the arguments interposed therein. In Preysler, Jr. v. Manila Southcoast Development Corporation, the Court restated the ruling that the date of the hearing should be at least three days after receipt of the notice of hearing by the other parties.

It is not, however, a hard and fast rule. Where a party has been given the opportunity to be heard, the time to study the motion and oppose it, there is compliance with the rule. This was the ruling in the case of Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, where it was written:

Purpose Behind the

Notice Requirement

This Court has indeed held time and time again that, under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, mandatory is the notice requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective by failure to comply with the requirement. As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading. 

As an integral component of procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules is not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution by the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.

The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. Considering the circumstances of the present case, we believe that the requirements of procedural due process were substantially complied with, and that the compliance justified a departure from a literal application of the rule on notice of hearing. [Emphasis supplied]

In the case at bench, the RTC gave UPPC sufficient time to file its comment on the motion. On January 14, 2005, UPPC filed its Opposition to the motion, discussing the issues raised by Acropolis in its motion. Thus, UPPCs right to due process was not violated because it was afforded the chance to argue its position. [United Pulp and Paper Co., Inc. vs Acropolis Central Guaranty Corporation, G.R. No. 171750, January 25, 2012]

Pre-trial order is not exclusive about the issues to be resolved by the trial court

It is true that the issues to be tried between the parties in a case shall be limited to those defined in the pre-trial order, as Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides:

Section 7. Record of pre-trial. The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon the termination thereof, the court shall issue an order which shall recite in detail the matters taken up in the conference, the action taken thereon, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements or admissions made by the parties as to any of the matters considered. Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall explicitly define and limit the issues to be tried. The contents of the order shall control the subsequent course of the action, unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice. (5a, R20) 

However, a pre-trial order is not intended to be a detailed catalogue of each and every issue that is to be taken during the trial, for it is unavoidable that there are issues that are impliedly included among those listed or that may be inferable from those listed by necessary implication which are as much integral parts of the pre-trial order as those expressly listed.

At any rate, it remains that the petitioner impleaded Cuevas and Saddul as defendants, and adduced against them evidence to prove their liabilities. With Cuevas and Saddul being parties to be affected by the judgment, it was only appropriate for the RTC to inquire into and determine their liability for the purpose of arriving at a complete determination of the suit. Thereby, the RTC acted in conformity with the avowed reason for which the courts are organized, which was to put an end to controversies, to decide the questions submitted by the litigants, and to settle the rights and obligations of the parties. [Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation vs Amalgamated Management and Development Corporation (AMDC), G.R. No. 177729, September 28, 2011]