Extra-judicial confession before a “bantay bayan" without counsel is inadmissible in evidence

Extrajudicial confession before a bantay bayan taken without counsel is inadmissible in evidence.

Facts: Antonio Lauga was accused of qualified rape committed against his 13-year old daughter. One of the witnesses for the prosecution was Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan in the barangay. Banting testified that after his assistance was sought, he proceeded to Lauga's house and found the latter wearing only his underwear. He invited Lauga to the police station, to which Lauga obliged. At the police outpost, Lauga admitted to him that he raped his daughter AAA because he was unable to control himself. Lauga contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with Banting. He argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a “bantay bayan,” the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement.

Held: Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the “bantay bayan,” are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a “bantay bayan,” particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession of appellant taken without  counsel was inadmissible in evidence. [People of the Philippines vs Antonio Lauga, G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010]

An extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible against his or her co-accused; exception

An extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible against his or her co-accused; exception

Facts: Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his 8-year-old daughter were shot and killed in 2003. The police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit wherein he stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by Lloyd Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo.

Columna was arrested. On March 8, 2004, he executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his participation as "look out" during the shooting and implicated Romulo Awingan as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, Lloyd Antiporda, ex-mayor and mayor, respectively, of Buguey, Cagayan.

Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint against those implicated by Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Columna affirmed his affidavit before the investigating prosecutor. During the preliminary investigation, Licerio presented Columna’s handwritten letter wherein the latter disowned the contents of his earlier affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. He stated that those he implicated had no participation in the killings.

The investigating prosecutor set a clarificatory hearing. During the hearing, Columna categorically admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. Thus, the investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges. In another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor, Columna said that he was only forced to withdraw all his statements against respondents during the clarificatory hearing because of the threats to his life inside the jail.

The RTC judge Daguna denied the motion to withdraw the informations and held that based on the affidavit which Columna affirmed before the investigating prosecutor, there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial. CA reversed the decision. Tamargo appealed.

Petitioner argues that, based on the independent assessment of the Judge Daguna, there was probable cause based on the earlier affidavit of Columna. She considered all the pieces of evidence but did not give credit to Columna’s recantation.

Awingan and the Antiporda's, on the other hand, contend that Columna’s extrajudicial confession was inadmissible against them because of the rule on res inter alios acta.

Held: Judge Daguna failed to consider that Columna’s extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios acta.

Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them. The reason for this rule is that:

on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.

An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.

Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them. [Harold V. Tamargo vs Romulo Awingan, et al., G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010]

Extrajudicial confession before barangay tanods and barangay chairman is inadmissible in evidence

Barangay tanods including the barangay chairman may be deemed law enforcement officers; extra-judicial confession before them is inadmissible.

Facts: Appellant Edna Malngan was convicted with arson. On appeal, she questioned the admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbor of the private complainant.

Held: Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution in part provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

x x x x

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this Section or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence.

To be admissible in evidence against an accused, the extrajudicial confessions made must satisfy the following requirements:

1. it must be voluntary;
2. it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
3. it must be express; and
4. it must be in writing.

Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses as well as killed the whole family of Roberto Separa, Sr.  She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1), of the Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellant’s confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo was made in response to the “interrogation” made by the latter – admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter found by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her as such were obtained in violation of her constitutional rights.

Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused-appellant’s confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo and the lighter as evidence do not automatically lead to her acquittal. It should well be recalled that the constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits to having committed the offense as what happened in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of Roberto Separa, Sr., to having started the fire in the Separas’ house.  The testimony of Mercedita Mendoza recounting said admission is, unfortunately for accused-appellant, admissible in evidence against her and is not covered by the aforesaid constitutional guarantee. Article III of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely governs the relationship between the individual on one hand and the State (and its agents) on the other; it does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another private individual – as both accused-appellant and prosecution witness Mercedita Mendoza undoubtedly are. Here, there is no evidence on record to show that said witness was acting under police authority, so appropriately, accused-appellant’s uncounselled extrajudicial confession to said witness was properly admitted by the RTC. [People of the Philippines vs Edna Malngan, G. R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006]

Extrajudicial confession before a barangay captain who is also a lawyer is inadmissible in evidence.

Extrajudicial confession before a barangay captain who is also a lawyer is an uncounselled confession and therefore, inadmissible in evidence. 

Facts: Appellant Elizar Tomaquin was convicted with murder. There were no eyewitnesses to the incident, and the prosecution’s evidence, aside from appellant’s extrajudicial confession, was mainly circumstantial. Said extrajudicial confession was given in the presence of Atty. Parawan, a barangay captain who is also a lawyer. Tomaquin questions the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession because it was an uncounselled confession. Tomaquin contends that the barangay captain, although a lawyer, may not be considered an independent counsel within the purview of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Held: Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. 

The words “competent and independent counsel” in the constitutional provision is not an empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer.

A barangay captain is called upon to enforce the law and ordinances in his barangay and ensure peace and order at all times.

In fact, a barangay captain is deemed a person in authority under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. – Who shall be deemed as such. – In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or government corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority. 

On these bases, it is not legally possible to consider the barangay captain as an independent counsel of appellant.

In this case the role of the barangay captain, was a peacekeeping officer of his barangay and therefore in direct conflict with the role of providing competent legal assistance to appellant who was accused of committing a crime in his jurisdiction, the barangay captain could not be considered as an independent counsel of appellant, when the latter executed his extrajudicial confession. What the Constitution requires is the presence of an independent and competent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client’s defense without any intervening conflict of interest.

Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify as a competent counsel, i.e., an effective and vigilant counsel. An “effective and vigilant counsel” necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.  As held in People vs. Velarde:

. . .  The competent and independent lawyer so engaged should be present at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.

[People of the Philippines vs Elizar Tomaquin, G.R. No. 133188, July 23, 2004]

Extrajudicial confession before a mayor is inadmissible in evidence

A municipal mayor cannot be an independent counsel as required by the Constitution; extra-judicial confession before him is inadmissible.

Facts: Barangay tanods and officials of Barangay Tikay, Municipality of Malolos arrested appellant Crispin Velarde while he was selling balut on the night of May 11, 1997. He was subsequently brought to the Malolos Police Station, where he was initially incarcerated and allegedly mauled. On May 14, 1997, his case was referred by the Malolos police to the incumbent mayor of Malolos, Bulacan, Atty. Danilo Domingo, who asked that appellant be brought to him. Upon the advice of the mayor, Velarde’s written extrajudicial confession was taken. During the investigation, appellant was assisted by the mayor as counsel. Armed police officers were also present during the investigation. The trial court found Velarde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide. On appeal, Velarde that the trial court erred in finding and declaring that there was nothing irregular or objectionable in Atty. Domingo's representation who is a lawyer of good standing and being the local chief executive of Malolos, Bulacan, to serve as counsel for the accused. Is the extrajudicial confession of accused admissible in evidence?

Held: No. Under the circumstances, Atty. Domingo cannot be considered as an independent counsel. He was the mayor of Malolos at the time. As such, he exercised “operational supervision and control” over the PNP unit in that municipality. His powers included the utilization of the elements thereof for the maintenance of peace and order, the prevention of crimes, the arrest of criminal offenders and the bringing of offenders to justice.

As mayor of Malolos, his duties were inconsistent with those of his responsibilities to appellant, who was already incarcerated and tagged as the main suspect in the rape-slay case. Serving as counsel of appellant placed him in direct conflict with his duty of “operational supervision and control” over the police. “What the Constitution requires in Article III Section 12 (1) is the presence of competent and independent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client’s defense without any intervening conflict of interest.” Evidently Atty. Domingo, being the mayor of the place where the investigation was taken, could not act as counsel, independent or otherwise, of appellant.

Furthermore, the right to counsel is a fundamental right and contemplates not just the mere presence of a lawyer beside the accused. The competent and independent lawyer so engaged should be present “at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview. The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing questioning.  If the advice given is so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired.”

During the investigation, Atty. Domingo failed to act as the independent and competent counsel envisioned by the Constitution. He failed to give any meaningful advice to protect the rights of appellant.  The former did not even bother to inform the latter of the consequences of an extrajudicial confession. It is clear that appellant was not assisted by a competent and independent counsel during the custodial investigation and the taking of his extra-judicial confession. Hence, the Court is duty-bound to disregard it. [People of the Philippines vs Crispin Velarde y Bandojo, G.R. No. 139333 July 18, 2002]

Writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is charged with an offense

The writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is charged with an offense in the Philippines.

Facts: In 1996, Lucien was deported and was barred from again entering the Philippines. In 1997, he was able to re-enter the country using an alias. He was subsequently caught by immigration agents and charged with violation of §45(d) of the Philippine Immigration Act for having entered the country illegally. He then filed a petition for habeas corpus.

Held: The writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is charged with an offense in the Philippines. Lucien is charged with violation of §45(d) of the Philippine Immigration Act. He is now detained because of said charge and therefore his petition for release on a writ of habeas corpus is without merit. [Lucien Tran Van Nghia vs. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 139758, January 31, 2000]

Extrajudicial confession before a municipal attorney is inadmissible in evidence

Municipal attorney cannot be an independent counsel as required by the constitution; extra-judicial confession before him is inadmissible in evidence.

Facts: Culala was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide. During trial, the prosecution introduced in evidence the extra-judicial confession of the Culala admitting the commission of the crime, alleged to have been obtained in the presence and with the assistance of the municipal attorney, who testified that he apprised the accused of his constitutional rights. Culala placed reliance on the defense of denial and alibi. He pointed out that the extra-judicial confession executed by him suffered from constitutional infirmities and consequently, inadmissible as evidence because it was extracted under duress, force and intimidation and was only countersigned later by the Municipal Attorney. After trial, the court convicted and sentenced Culala of death penalty. Is the extrajudicial confession of accused admissible in evidence?

Held: On the admissibility of subject extra-judicial confession of accused-appellant, it is worthy to note that during the custodial investigation he was assisted by Atty. Celso E. Santamaria, Municipal Attorney of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.  In People vs. Bandula, it was held that a Municipal Attorney cannot be an independent counsel as required by the Constitution. As a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and order.  It is therefore seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. He is no better than a fiscal or a prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations. Consequently, for being violative of the Constitution, the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is inadmissible. [People of the Philippines vs Elizalde Culala y Bognot, G.R. No. 83466, October 13, 1999]

How shall ranking in the sanggunian be determined for purposes of succession?

For purposes of succession, ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained to the total number of registered voters in each district.

Facts: Due to the suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima of the Province of Albay, Vice-Governor Danilo Azana automatically assumed the powers and functions of the governor, leaving vacant his post as vice-governor. The Comelec certified Jesus James Calisin of District 1 as first ranking member with Juan Victoria of District 2 as second ranking member based on the number of votes obtained by the Sanggunian members in relation to the number of registered voters in the district. Pursuant to the Comelec resolution, DILG Secretary Alunan designated Calisin as acting Vice-Governor. 

Victoria claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members should not only be based on the number of votes obtained in relation to the total number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the district who actually voted therein. He further argues that a district may have a large number of registered voters but only a few actually voted, in which case the winning candidate would register a low percentage of the number of votes obtained. Conversely, a district may have a smaller number of registered voters but may have a big voters' turn-out, in which case the winning candidate would get a higher percentage of the votes. Applying his formula, Victoria would come out to be the highest ranking Sanggunian member.

Held: Section 44 of the Local Government Code provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice-governor, the highest ranking Sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking Sanggunian member, shall become vice-governor. "For purposes of succession, ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election."

The law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district. In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to merely apply the law. The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words. Victoria's contention must very well be addressed to the legislative branch and not to the Court which has no power to change the law. [Victoria vs Comelec, G.R. No. 109005, January 10, 1994]