Facts: In 2001, an Information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal use of alias was likewise filed against Estrada. The information in the latter case read:
"That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then President of the Republic of the Philippines, without having been duly authorized, judicially or administratively, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to office, i.e., in order to CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED during his tenure and his true identity as THE President of the Republic of the Philippines, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS JOSE VELARDE IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias Jose Velarde which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.
CONTRARY TO LAW."The two cases were consolidated for joint trial.
After the People rested, the defense moved to be allowed to file a demurrer to evidence in these cases, which the Sandiganbayan granted.
The demurrer to evidence for illegal use of alias was anchored on the following grounds:
1. Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the prosecution, only two (2) witnesses, Ms. Clarissa Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato, testified that on one occasion (4 February 2000), they saw movant use the name Jose Velarde;
2. The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal and was prohibited only in late 2001 as can be gleaned from Bangko Sentral Circular No. 302, series of 2001, dated 11 October 2001;
3. There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as the documents offered by the prosecution are banking documents which, by their nature, are confidential and cannot be revealed without following proper procedures; and
4. The use of alias is absorbed in plunder.
The Sandiganbayan issued a joint resolution granting Estrada's demurrer to evidence. The Sandiganbayan found that the People failed to present evidence that Estrada committed the crime punished under Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act No. 6085, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ursua v. Court of Appeals. It ruled that there is an illegal use of alias within the context of CA 142 only if the use of the alias is public and habitual.
Issue: Was the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias Jose Velarde public?
Held: The Supreme Court, citing the earlier case of Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, defined an “alias” as:
To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public who had no access to Estradas privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired in Malacaan where he sat as President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at that time. The same holds true for Estradas alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of Estradas representations to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.
The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests, affords Estrada a reasonable expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act related to the opening of a trust account a transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely confidential in nature.
Bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy. Given the private nature of Estradas act of signing the documents as Jose Velarde related to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim that there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. We need not even consider here the impact of the obligations imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the bank officers; what is essentially significant is the privacy situation that is necessarily implied in these kinds of transactions. This statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction was done publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly." (People vs Estrada, G.R. Nos. 164368-69, April 2, 2009)
Held: The Supreme Court, citing the earlier case of Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, defined an “alias” as:
a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. There must be, in the words of Ursua, a sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name (the alias) in addition to his real name from that day forth [for the use of alias to] fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.The required publicity in the use of alias is more than mere communication to a third person; the use of the alias, to be considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to cause it to become generally known. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that other name. In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest.
To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public who had no access to Estradas privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired in Malacaan where he sat as President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at that time. The same holds true for Estradas alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of Estradas representations to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.
The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests, affords Estrada a reasonable expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act related to the opening of a trust account a transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely confidential in nature.
Bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy. Given the private nature of Estradas act of signing the documents as Jose Velarde related to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim that there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. We need not even consider here the impact of the obligations imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the bank officers; what is essentially significant is the privacy situation that is necessarily implied in these kinds of transactions. This statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction was done publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly." (People vs Estrada, G.R. Nos. 164368-69, April 2, 2009)
