Extrajudicial confession before barangay tanods and barangay chairman is inadmissible in evidence

Barangay tanods including the barangay chairman may be deemed law enforcement officers; extra-judicial confession before them is inadmissible.

Facts: Appellant Edna Malngan was convicted with arson. On appeal, she questioned the admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbor of the private complainant.

Held: Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution in part provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

x x x x

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this Section or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence.

To be admissible in evidence against an accused, the extrajudicial confessions made must satisfy the following requirements:

1. it must be voluntary;
2. it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
3. it must be express; and
4. it must be in writing.

Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses as well as killed the whole family of Roberto Separa, Sr.  She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1), of the Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellant’s confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo was made in response to the “interrogation” made by the latter – admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter found by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her as such were obtained in violation of her constitutional rights.

Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused-appellant’s confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo and the lighter as evidence do not automatically lead to her acquittal. It should well be recalled that the constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits to having committed the offense as what happened in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of Roberto Separa, Sr., to having started the fire in the Separas’ house.  The testimony of Mercedita Mendoza recounting said admission is, unfortunately for accused-appellant, admissible in evidence against her and is not covered by the aforesaid constitutional guarantee. Article III of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely governs the relationship between the individual on one hand and the State (and its agents) on the other; it does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another private individual – as both accused-appellant and prosecution witness Mercedita Mendoza undoubtedly are. Here, there is no evidence on record to show that said witness was acting under police authority, so appropriately, accused-appellant’s uncounselled extrajudicial confession to said witness was properly admitted by the RTC. [People of the Philippines vs Edna Malngan, G. R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006]

Extrajudicial confession before a barangay captain who is also a lawyer is inadmissible in evidence.

Extrajudicial confession before a barangay captain who is also a lawyer is an uncounselled confession and therefore, inadmissible in evidence. 

Facts: Appellant Elizar Tomaquin was convicted with murder. There were no eyewitnesses to the incident, and the prosecution’s evidence, aside from appellant’s extrajudicial confession, was mainly circumstantial. Said extrajudicial confession was given in the presence of Atty. Parawan, a barangay captain who is also a lawyer. Tomaquin questions the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession because it was an uncounselled confession. Tomaquin contends that the barangay captain, although a lawyer, may not be considered an independent counsel within the purview of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Held: Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. 

The words “competent and independent counsel” in the constitutional provision is not an empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer.

A barangay captain is called upon to enforce the law and ordinances in his barangay and ensure peace and order at all times.

In fact, a barangay captain is deemed a person in authority under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. – Who shall be deemed as such. – In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or government corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority. 

On these bases, it is not legally possible to consider the barangay captain as an independent counsel of appellant.

In this case the role of the barangay captain, was a peacekeeping officer of his barangay and therefore in direct conflict with the role of providing competent legal assistance to appellant who was accused of committing a crime in his jurisdiction, the barangay captain could not be considered as an independent counsel of appellant, when the latter executed his extrajudicial confession. What the Constitution requires is the presence of an independent and competent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client’s defense without any intervening conflict of interest.

Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify as a competent counsel, i.e., an effective and vigilant counsel. An “effective and vigilant counsel” necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.  As held in People vs. Velarde:

. . .  The competent and independent lawyer so engaged should be present at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.

[People of the Philippines vs Elizar Tomaquin, G.R. No. 133188, July 23, 2004]