The civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts and delicts of their minor children is primary and not subsidiary

● Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding, the parents liable, but the categorization of their liability as being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard second look considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which warrant comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our readings that if the liability of the parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. On the other hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is considered direct and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid and substantial defense.

We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in case of his death of incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that" (t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages."

We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies committed by their minor children is likewise primary, not subsidiary. Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

"ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. —

x       x       x

First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by . . . a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part." (Emphasis supplied.) 

Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the foregoing provision the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family.

That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond with his own property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil Code states that" (i)f the minor causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor . . . shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed." For civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

"Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said . . . minor shall respond with (his) own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with civil law."

The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor children contemplated in the aforesaid rule in Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code has, aside from the aforecited case of Fuellas, been the subject of a number of cases adjudicated by this Court, viz.: Exconde v. Capuno, Et Al., 22 Araneta v. Arreglado, 23 Salen, Et. Al. v. Balce, 24 Paleyan, etc., Et. Al. v. Bangkili, Et Al., 25 and Elcano, et al, v. Hill, Et. Al. (Libi vs IAC, G.R. No. 70890, September 18, 1992). 

Parents are primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages

Facts: Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, both minors, were sweethearts for two years. Julie broke up her relationship with Wendell after finding the latter sadistic and irresponsible. Wendell incessantly pursued her and demanded reconciliation but Julie persisted in her refusal, prompting the Wendell to resort to threats against her. One day, there were found dead from a single gunshot wound each coming from a revolver licensed in the name of Cresencio Libi, father of Wendell. The parents of Julie Ann filed against Wendell's parents to recover damages, arising from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 

Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of them holds a key to the safety deposit box and her key is always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box.

Issue: WON the parents should be held liable for damages.

Held: Petitioner spouses had not really been exercising the diligence of a good father by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was. Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from having access to said gun which was allegedly kept in a safety deposit box, spouses Libi are subsidiarily liable for the natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was living in their company.

Parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. Such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 

Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified. (Libi vs. IAC, G.R. No. 70890, September 18, 1992). 

Operator on record of a vehicle is primarily liable regardless of whether the employee drove the vehicle in connection with his employment

The operator on record of a vehicle is primarily responsible to third persons for the deaths or injuries consequent to its operation, regardless of whether the employee drove the registered owners vehicle in connection with his employment.

Facts: Oscar, the registered owner of a jeep that was involved in a vehicular accident, contends that his employee Allan drove the jeep in his private capacity and thus, an employers vicarious liability for the employees fault under Article 2180 of the Civil Code cannot apply to him.

Held: The contention is no longer novel.  In Aguilar Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank, the car of therein respondent bank caused the death of Conrado Aguilar, Jr. while being driven by its assistant vice president.  Despite Article 2180, we still held the bank liable for damages for the accident as said provision should defer to the settled doctrine concerning accidents involving registered motor vehicles, i.e., that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.  We have already ratiocinated that:

The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways.

Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use or that the subject vehicle was stolen which are valid defenses available to a registered owner, Oscar Jr. cannot escape liability for quasi-delict resulting from his jeeps use. [Del Carmen, Jr. vs Bacoy, G.R. No. 173870, April 25, 2012]

Registered owner of any vehicle primarily liable for death, injuries and damages it caused

Registered owner of any vehicle, even if not for public service, is primarily responsible to third persons for deaths, injuries and damages it caused.

Facts: Commercial Savings Bank was the registered owner of the car while Borja was its assistant vice president. The car figured in a vehicular accident resulting to the death of Aguilar's son. The trial court found Borja negligent in driving the car and ordered the bank and Borja to jointly and severally pay actual and moral damages to Aguilar. The bank appealed, contending that it has no vicarious liability since Borja committed the act outside the actual performance of his assigned tasks or duties. It insisted that Borja was driving the car in his private capacity and was not performing functions in furtherance of the interest of the bank. Additionally, according to the bank, Borja already bought the car on installment basis. Hence, at the time of the incident, the bank concluded it was no longer the owner of the car.

Held: As the registered owner of the vehicle, Commercial Savings Bank is primarily liable for Aguilar, Jr.’s death. 

In BA Finance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 715, we had already held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not for public service, is primarily responsible to third persons for deaths, injuries and damages it caused. This is true even if the vehicle is leased to third persons.

As early as Erezo vs. Jepte, 102 Phil. 103, the Court through Labrador, J. had synthesized the rationale for holding the registered owner of a vehicle directly liable. There we said:

Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act by which ownership in vehicles is transferred, as in land registration cases, because the administrative proceeding of registration does not bear any essential relation to the contract of sale between the parties (Chinchilla vs. Rafael and Verdaguer, 39 Phil. 888), but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle upon any public highway (section 5 [a], Act No. 3992, as amended.) The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways.

With the above policy in mind, the question that defendant-appellant poses is: should not the registered owner be allowed at the trial to prove who the actual and real owner is, and in accordance with such proof escape or evade responsibility and lay the same on the person actually owning the vehicle? We hold with the trial court that the law does not allow him to do so; the law, with its aim and policy in mind, does not relieve him directly of the responsibility that the law fixes and places upon him as an incident or consequence of registration. Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. He has no means other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership. If the policy of the law is to be enforced and carried out, the registered owner should not be allowed to prove the contrary to the prejudice of the person injured, that is, to prove that a third person or another has become the owner, so that he may thereby be relieved of the responsibility to the injured person.


The above policy and application of the law may appear quite harsh and would seem to conflict with truth and justice. We do not think it is so. A registered owner who has already sold or transferred a vehicle has the recourse to a third-party complaint, in the same action brought against him to recover for the damage or injury done, against the vendee or transferee of the vehicle. The inconvenience of the suit is no justification for relieving him of liability; said inconvenience is the price he pays for failure to comply with the registration that the law demands and requires. [Aguilar vs Commercial Savings Bank and Ferdinand Aguilar, G.R. No. 128705, June 29, 2001]

Owner of a vehicle not liable for an accident if the same was driven without his consent or knowledge and by a person not employed by him

Can the owner of a private vehicle which figured in an accident be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code when the said vehicle was neither driven without his consent or knowledge and by a person not employed by him?

Facts: Private respondents were on board a jeep when they met an accident with another jeep driven by Sabiniano. Private respondents thus they filed a case for damages against driver Sabiniano and owner of the jeep Duavit. Duavit admits ownership of the jeep but contends that he should not be held liable since Sabiniano is not his employee and that the jeep was taken by Sabiniano without his consent. Sabiniano categorically admitted that he took the jeep from the garage of defendant Duavit without the consent or authority of the latter. He testified further, that Duavit even filed charges against him for theft of the jeep, but which Duavit did not push through as his parents apologized to Duavit on his behalf. The trial court absolved Duavit from liability; hence, private respondents appealed. 

Held: An owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an accident involving the said vehicle if the same was driven without his consent or knowledge and by a person not employed by him. To hold the petitioner liable for the accident caused by the negligence of Sabiniano who was neither his driver nor employee would be absurd as it would be like holding liable the owner of a stolen vehicle for an accident caused by the person who stole such vehicle. [Duavit vs CA, G.R. No. 82318, May 18, 1989]

●Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use or that the subject vehicle was stolen which are valid defenses available to a registered owner, Oscar Jr. cannot escape liability for quasi-delict resulting from his jeeps use. [Del Carmen, Jr. vs Bacoy, G.R. No. 173870, April 25, 2012]