An alias is a name that is different from the individual’s true name, and does not refer to a name that is not different from his true name

Facts: Limson filed a case for falsification against Eugenio Juan Gonzalez. Limson asserted that in the records of the Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC), a certain ‘EUGENIO GONZALEZ’ is registered as an architect and that Gonzalez, who uses, among others, the name ‘EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ’, pretends to be said architect. Gonzalez is an impostor and therefore, guilty of falsification. 

Gonzalez filed his Counter–Affidavit, wherein he explained in detail that his full name is EUGENIO JUAN GONZALES y REGALADO. He alleges that in grade school and high school, he used the name EUGENIO GONZALEZ y REGALADO and/or EUGENIO GONZALEZ but when he transferred to the University of Sto. Tomas and took up Architecture, he made use of his second name, JUAN after EUGENIO. After he passed the board exam, he made use as much as possible the name Arch. Eugenio Juan Gonzalez, because the surname GONZALEZ was and is still, a very common surname throughout the Philippines and he wanted to distinguish himself.

After weighing the evidence, the investigating prosecutor dismissed the case. Limson appealed to the Secretary of Justice who affirmed the findings of the prosecutor.

Limson then filed a new letter complaint against Gonzalez with the Secretary of Justice, alleging the same accusations, this time for violation of the Anti-Alias Law. The DOJ referred to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City and docketed as a new case. Even so, the Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the new case. 

When her case met the same fate, Limson again filed a petition for review with the DOJ, which again denied her petition. The CA affirmed the decision of the DOJ.

In her petition for review on certiorari filed with the Supreme Court, Limson insists that the names “Eugenio Gonzalez” and “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado” did not refer to one and the same individual; and that respondent Gonzalez was not a registered architect contrary to his claim. According to her, there were material discrepancies between the graduation photograph of respondent taken in 1941 when he earned his degree in Architecture from the University of Sto. Tomas, Manila, and another photograph of him taken for his driver’s license in 1996, arguing that the person in the latter photograph was not the same individual depicted in the 1941 photograph. She submits documents showing that respondent used aliases from birth, and passed himself off as such persons when in fact he was not.

Held: The Supreme Court held that it is not a trier of facts, and cannot analyze and weigh evidence.

It also held that Limson did not persuasively demonstrate to the CA how the Secretary of Justice had been gravely wrong in upholding the dismissal by the OCP of her charges against respondent. In contrast, the assailed resolutions of the Secretary of Justice were quite exhaustive in their exposition of the reasons for the dismissal of the charges. And, even assuming that the Secretary of Justice thereby erred, she should have shown to the CA that either arbitrariness or capriciousness or whimsicality had tainted the error. Yet, she tendered no such showing. She should be reminded, indeed, that grave abuse of discretion meant either that the judicial or quasi–judicial power was exercised by the Secretary of Justice in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the Secretary of Justice evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when the Secretary of Justice, while exercising judicial or quasi–judicial powers, acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

On the issue of the alleged use of illegal aliases, the court held that respondent’s aliases involved the names “Eugenio Gonzalez”, “Eugenio Gonzales”, “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez”, “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado”, “Eugenio C.R. Gonzalez”, “Eugenio J. Gonzalez”, and – per Limson – “Eugenio Juan Robles Gonzalez.” But these names contained his true names, albeit at times joined with an erroneous middle or second name, or a misspelled family name in one instance. The records disclose that the erroneous middle or second names, or the misspelling of the family name resulted from error or inadvertence left unchecked and unrectified over time. What is significant, however, is that such names were not fictitious names within the purview of the Anti–Alias Law; and that such names were not different from each other. Considering that he was not also shown to have used the names for unscrupulous purposes, or to deceive or confuse the public, the dismissal of the charge against him was justified in fact and in law.

An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually, usually in business transactions, in addition to the real name by which he was registered at birth or baptized the first time, or to the substitute name authorized by a competent authority; a man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him, but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. An alias is thus a name that is different from the individual’s true name, and does not refer to a name that is not different from his true name." (Limson vs. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 162205, March 31, 2014)

Use of fictitious name in a single transaction without intending to be known by this name in addition to his real name, not a violation of anti-alias law

Facts:

In 1989, Cesario Ursua was charged with bribery. His lawyer asked him to get a copy of the complaint against him from the Office of the Ombudsman since the law firm’s messenger, a certain Oscar Perez, was not available. 

Before going to the Ombudsman, Ursua talked to Perez and told him that he is reluctant to ask for a copy of the complaint because he is the respondent in the said case. Perez then told him than he can just sign as “Oscar Perez” so that he does not have to reveal his true identity.

At the Office of the Ombudsman, Ursua signed the logbook there as “Oscar Perez”. When he was handed a copy of the complaint by Loida Kahulugan, he signed the receipt as “Oscar Perez”. 

Before he could leave the premises, Ursua was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo who also works in the same office. When Loida learned that he was in fact Cesario Ursua, she recommended that a criminal case be filed against Ursua. Eventually, Ursua was sentenced to three years in prison for violating C.A. No. 142, as amended, otherwise known as “An Act To Regulate The Use Of Aliases”.

Issue: Was Cesario Ursua’s conviction proper?

Held: No. Ursua should be acquitted. 

"An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A mans name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. 

It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as Oscar Perez, which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that Oscar Perez is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name Oscar Perez was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.

While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. 

Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers."(Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112170, April 10, 1996)

Note: In short, the evils sought to be avoided by the C.A. No. 142 was not brought about when Ursua used a name other than his name. A strict application of the law is not warranted. When Ursua used the name of Oscar Perez, no fraud was committed; there was no crime committed punishable under C.A. No. 142. The purpose of the law is to punish evils defined therein so when no such evil was produced by Ursua’s act, said law need not be applied. - http://www.uberdigests.info

The MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to enforce the kasunduan regardless of the amount or the nature of the issue involved

Facts: Michael and Annabel entered into an amicable settlement, evidenced by a document denominated as "kasunduan'' wherein Michael agreed to pay Annabel the amount of P250,000.00 on specific dates. The kasunduan was not repudiated. When Michael failed to honor the kasunduan, the Barangay Captain failed to enforce the kasunduan, and instead, issued a Certification to File Action. After about one and a half years from the date of the execution of the kasunduan, Angelita filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court an action to enforce the same. Michael contends that since the amount of P250,000.00 - the subject matter of the kasunduan - is in excess of MCTC's jurisdictional amount of P200,000.00, the kasunduan is beyond the MCTC's jurisdiction to hear and to resolve.

Issue: Whether or not the MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to execute the kasunduan regardless of the amount involved

Held: We again draw attention to the provision of Section 417 of the Local Government Code that after the lapse of the six (6) month period from the date of the settlement, the agreement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal court.

The law, as written, unequivocally speaks of the "appropriate city or municipal court" as the forum for the execution of the settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. Notably, in expressly conferring authority over these courts, Section 417 made no distinction with respect to the amount involved or the nature of the issue involved. Thus, there can be no question that the law's intendment was to grant jurisdiction over the enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards to the city or municipal courts regardless of the amount. A basic principle of interpretation is that words must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation where the words of a statute are clear,' plain and free from ambiguity. (Sebastian vs. Ng, G.R. No. 164594, April 22, 2015)