Facts:
In 1989, Cesario Ursua was charged with bribery. His lawyer asked him to get a copy of the complaint against him from the Office of the Ombudsman since the law firm’s messenger, a certain Oscar Perez, was not available.
Before going to the Ombudsman, Ursua talked to Perez and told him that he is reluctant to ask for a copy of the complaint because he is the respondent in the said case. Perez then told him than he can just sign as “Oscar Perez” so that he does not have to reveal his true identity.
At the Office of the Ombudsman, Ursua signed the logbook there as “Oscar Perez”. When he was handed a copy of the complaint by Loida Kahulugan, he signed the receipt as “Oscar Perez”.
Before he could leave the premises, Ursua was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo who also works in the same office. When Loida learned that he was in fact Cesario Ursua, she recommended that a criminal case be filed against Ursua. Eventually, Ursua was sentenced to three years in prison for violating C.A. No. 142, as amended, otherwise known as “An Act To Regulate The Use Of Aliases”.
Issue: Was Cesario Ursua’s conviction proper?
Held: No. Ursua should be acquitted.
"An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A mans name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as Oscar Perez, which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that Oscar Perez is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name Oscar Perez was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused.
Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers."(Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112170, April 10, 1996)
Note: In short, the evils sought to be avoided by the C.A. No. 142 was not brought about when Ursua used a name other than his name. A strict application of the law is not warranted. When Ursua used the name of Oscar Perez, no fraud was committed; there was no crime committed punishable under C.A. No. 142. The purpose of the law is to punish evils defined therein so when no such evil was produced by Ursua’s act, said law need not be applied. - http://www.uberdigests.info
