A municipal mayor cannot be an independent counsel as required by the Constitution; extra-judicial confession before him is inadmissible.
Facts: Barangay tanods and officials of Barangay Tikay, Municipality of Malolos arrested appellant Crispin Velarde while he was selling balut on the night of May 11, 1997. He was subsequently brought to the Malolos Police Station, where he was initially incarcerated and allegedly mauled. On May 14, 1997, his case was referred by the Malolos police to the incumbent mayor of Malolos, Bulacan, Atty. Danilo Domingo, who asked that appellant be brought to him. Upon the advice of the mayor, Velarde’s written extrajudicial confession was taken. During the investigation, appellant was assisted by the mayor as counsel. Armed police officers were also present during the investigation. The trial court found Velarde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide. On appeal, Velarde that the trial court erred in finding and declaring that there was nothing irregular or objectionable in Atty. Domingo's representation who is a lawyer of good standing and being the local chief executive of Malolos, Bulacan, to serve as counsel for the accused. Is the extrajudicial confession of accused admissible in evidence?
Held: No. Under the circumstances, Atty. Domingo cannot be considered as an independent counsel. He was the mayor of Malolos at the time. As such, he exercised “operational supervision and control” over the PNP unit in that municipality. His powers included the utilization of the elements thereof for the maintenance of peace and order, the prevention of crimes, the arrest of criminal offenders and the bringing of offenders to justice.
As mayor of Malolos, his duties were inconsistent with those of his responsibilities to appellant, who was already incarcerated and tagged as the main suspect in the rape-slay case. Serving as counsel of appellant placed him in direct conflict with his duty of “operational supervision and control” over the police. “What the Constitution requires in Article III Section 12 (1) is the presence of competent and independent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client’s defense without any intervening conflict of interest.” Evidently Atty. Domingo, being the mayor of the place where the investigation was taken, could not act as counsel, independent or otherwise, of appellant.
Furthermore, the right to counsel is a fundamental right and contemplates not just the mere presence of a lawyer beside the accused. The competent and independent lawyer so engaged should be present “at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview. The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired.”
During the investigation, Atty. Domingo failed to act as the independent and competent counsel envisioned by the Constitution. He failed to give any meaningful advice to protect the rights of appellant. The former did not even bother to inform the latter of the consequences of an extrajudicial confession. It is clear that appellant was not assisted by a competent and independent counsel during the custodial investigation and the taking of his extra-judicial confession. Hence, the Court is duty-bound to disregard it. [People of the Philippines vs Crispin Velarde y Bandojo, G.R. No. 139333 July 18, 2002]
