Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Accordingly, a compromise is either judicial, if the objective is to put an end to a pending litigation, or extrajudicial, if the objective is to avoid a litigation. As a contract, a compromise is perfected by mutual consent. However, a judicial compromise, while immediately binding between the parties upon its execution, is not executory until it is approved by the court and reduced to a judgment. The validity of a compromise is dependent upon its compliance with the requisites and principles of contracts dictated by law. Also, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Spouses Jorja Rigor Soriano and Magin Soriano, G.R. No. 178312. January 30, 2013)
In order to establish an implied trust in real property by parol evidence, the proof should be as fully convincing as if the acts giving rise to the trust obligation are proven by an authentic document
Facts: Ramon, Lorenzo and Benjamin are brothers.
In 1966, Ramon Yap, an accountant, purchased a parcel of land situated in Quezon City from Spouses Nery. The lot was thereupon registered in the name of Ramon Yap. He also declared the property in his name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon from 1966 to 1992.
In 1962 Ramon constructed a two-storey 3-door apartment building for the use of the Yap family. 1/5 of the cost of the construction was defrayed by Ramon while the rest was shouldered by their mother Chua Mia. Upon the request of the old woman, the tax declaration for the real estate was placed under the name of Lorenzo.
Lorenzo died in 1970. Upon his death, petitioners (Lorenzo's wife Sally and their children) were allowed by Ramon to stay in one unit of the apartment building. On March 18, 1992, Ramon Yap sold the land and his share of the 3-door apartment to Benjamin.
Upon learning of the sale, petitioners advised Ramon of their claim of ownership over the property and demanded that Ramon execute the proper deed necessary to transfer the title to them.
Ramon and Benjamin filed an action with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, for quieting of title against petitioners. In their answer, petitioner's averred that sometime in 1966 the spouses Nery offered to sell the disputed parcel of land to Lorenzo Yap. Since Lorenzo and Sally Yap were at that time Chinese citizens, Lorenzo requested his brother Ramon to allow the use of the latter's name in the purchase, registration, and declaration for tax purposes of the subject lot to which Ramon Yap consented. It was agreed that the property would remain registered in the name of Ramon Yap until such time as Lorenzo would have acquired Philippine citizenship but that, should Lorenzo predecease, the lot would then be transferred to Lorenzo's heirs upon the latter's naturalization. Petitioners contended that it was Lorenzo who had caused the construction of the 3-door apartment on the property, merely entrusting the money therefor to Ramon. The death of Lorenzo in 1970 prompted petitioners to move in and occupy the apartment and the lot, without any objection from Ramon and Benjamin, although the latter were allowed to stay in the premises since they had no other place to live in. In 1991, petitioners acquired Philippine citizenship and, forthwith, they requested Ramon Yap to have the title to the lot transferred to their names but to their chagrin they discovered that Ramon had sold the lot to Benjamin.
The RTC adjudged Benjamin Yap to be the true and lawful owner of the disputed property. CA affirmed the decision.
In 1966, Ramon Yap, an accountant, purchased a parcel of land situated in Quezon City from Spouses Nery. The lot was thereupon registered in the name of Ramon Yap. He also declared the property in his name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon from 1966 to 1992.
In 1962 Ramon constructed a two-storey 3-door apartment building for the use of the Yap family. 1/5 of the cost of the construction was defrayed by Ramon while the rest was shouldered by their mother Chua Mia. Upon the request of the old woman, the tax declaration for the real estate was placed under the name of Lorenzo.
Lorenzo died in 1970. Upon his death, petitioners (Lorenzo's wife Sally and their children) were allowed by Ramon to stay in one unit of the apartment building. On March 18, 1992, Ramon Yap sold the land and his share of the 3-door apartment to Benjamin.
Upon learning of the sale, petitioners advised Ramon of their claim of ownership over the property and demanded that Ramon execute the proper deed necessary to transfer the title to them.
Ramon and Benjamin filed an action with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, for quieting of title against petitioners. In their answer, petitioner's averred that sometime in 1966 the spouses Nery offered to sell the disputed parcel of land to Lorenzo Yap. Since Lorenzo and Sally Yap were at that time Chinese citizens, Lorenzo requested his brother Ramon to allow the use of the latter's name in the purchase, registration, and declaration for tax purposes of the subject lot to which Ramon Yap consented. It was agreed that the property would remain registered in the name of Ramon Yap until such time as Lorenzo would have acquired Philippine citizenship but that, should Lorenzo predecease, the lot would then be transferred to Lorenzo's heirs upon the latter's naturalization. Petitioners contended that it was Lorenzo who had caused the construction of the 3-door apartment on the property, merely entrusting the money therefor to Ramon. The death of Lorenzo in 1970 prompted petitioners to move in and occupy the apartment and the lot, without any objection from Ramon and Benjamin, although the latter were allowed to stay in the premises since they had no other place to live in. In 1991, petitioners acquired Philippine citizenship and, forthwith, they requested Ramon Yap to have the title to the lot transferred to their names but to their chagrin they discovered that Ramon had sold the lot to Benjamin.
The RTC adjudged Benjamin Yap to be the true and lawful owner of the disputed property. CA affirmed the decision.
Issue: Was Sally's testimony enough to prove the existence of a trust?
Held: It is true that an implied trust may be established by parol evidence. Even then, in order to establish an implied trust in real property by parol evidence, the proof should be as fully convincing as if the acts giving rise to the trust obligation are proven by an authentic document. An implied trust, in fine, cannot be established upon vague and inconclusive proof.
The evidence submitted by Sally consisting mainly of her self-serving testimony is utterly wanting as against the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Spouses Nery in favor of Ramon which is public document and is presumed to have been regularly executed. The fact that the business establishment of her husband Lorenzo was razed by fire in 1964 would somehow place to doubt the claim that he indeed had the means to purchase the subject land about two years later from the Nery spouses. Upon the other hand, Ramon Yap was by then an accountant with apparent means to buy the property himself.
Furthermore, the trust agreement between Ramon and Lorenzo, if indeed extant, would have been in contravention of, in fact, the fundamental law limiting transfer or assignment of land only to citizens of the Philippines. A trust or a provision in the terms of the trust would be invalid if the enforcement thereof is against the law even though its performance does not involve the commission of a criminal tortuous act. (Heirs of Lorenzo Yap et. al. vs. Court of Appeals et. al. G.R. No. 133047 Aug. 17, 1998)
No implied trust if the person to whom the title is conveyed is the child of the one paying the price of the sale
Facts: Alexander Ty died at the age of 34. His wife, Sylvia, files petition for the settlement of his intestate estate. She also asks court to sell or mortgage properties in order to pay the estate tax amounting to 4 million assessed by the BIR. The properties include a parcel of land in EDSA Greenhills, a residential land in Wack Wack, and the Meridien condo unit in Annapolis, Greenhills.
Alejandro Ty, father of Alexander, opposed the move and filed for recovery of the property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. Alejandro claims that he owns the EDSA, Wack Wack and Meridien condo unit because he paid for them. The property was supposedly registered in trust for Alexander’s brothers and sisters in case he dies. He claimed that Alex had no financial capacity to purchase the disputed property, as the latter was only dependent on him.
Sylvia countered that Alexander had purchased the property with his money. Alexander was financially capable of purchasing it because he had been managing the family corporations since he was 18 years old and was also engage in other profitable businesses.
The RTC granted the application for preliminary injunction and decides in favor of Alejandro regarding the recovery of the property. CA reversed the RTC stating that the implication created by law under Art. 1448 does not apply if the property was in the name of the purchaser’s child. They agreed that Alejandro partly paid for the EDSA property. Alejandro appealed.
Issue: Whether there was an implied trust under Art. 1448 of the Civil Code?
Held: No, there was no implied trust created in relation to the EDSA property. Article 1448 of the Civil Code is clear. If the person to whom the title is conveyed is the child of the one paying the price of the sale, NO TRUST IS IMPLIED BY LAW. The law, instead, disputably presumes a donation in favor of the child.
Regarding the Meridien Condo and Wack Wack property, the court said that plaintiff failed to prove that purchase money came from him. They also said that Alexander was capable of purchasing the property as he had been working for nine years, had a car care business, and was actively engaged in the business dealings of several family corporations from which he received emoluments and other benefits. Hence, no implied trust created because there was no proof that plaintiff had paid for said properties. (Alejandro Ty vs Sylvia Ty, G.R. No. 165696, April 30, 2008)
Does the law allow one to drop the middle name from his registered name?
That the continued use of middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from registered complete name
Facts: Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will study, Anna Lisa decided to file a petition in the Regional Trial Court seeking to drop Julian's middle name and have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The reason given for the change of name sought in the petition is that Julian may be discriminated against when he studies in Singapore because of his middle name since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother is not carried in a person's name.
Issue: Does the law allow one to drop the middle name from his registered name?
Held: In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available. What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts.
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. When an illegitimate child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public instrument or private handwritten instrument, he then bears both his mother's surname as his middle name and his father's surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given name, a middle name and a surname.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws. (In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang G.R. 159966, March 30 2005, 454 SCRA 2155).
Held: In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available. What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts.
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. When an illegitimate child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public instrument or private handwritten instrument, he then bears both his mother's surname as his middle name and his father's surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given name, a middle name and a surname.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws. (In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang G.R. 159966, March 30 2005, 454 SCRA 2155).
The required publicity in the use of alias is more than mere communication to a third person; the use of the alias, to be considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to cause it to become generally known
Facts: In 2001, an Information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal use of alias was likewise filed against Estrada. The information in the latter case read:
"That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then President of the Republic of the Philippines, without having been duly authorized, judicially or administratively, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to office, i.e., in order to CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED during his tenure and his true identity as THE President of the Republic of the Philippines, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS JOSE VELARDE IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias Jose Velarde which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.
CONTRARY TO LAW."The two cases were consolidated for joint trial.
After the People rested, the defense moved to be allowed to file a demurrer to evidence in these cases, which the Sandiganbayan granted.
The demurrer to evidence for illegal use of alias was anchored on the following grounds:
1. Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the prosecution, only two (2) witnesses, Ms. Clarissa Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato, testified that on one occasion (4 February 2000), they saw movant use the name Jose Velarde;
2. The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal and was prohibited only in late 2001 as can be gleaned from Bangko Sentral Circular No. 302, series of 2001, dated 11 October 2001;
3. There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as the documents offered by the prosecution are banking documents which, by their nature, are confidential and cannot be revealed without following proper procedures; and
4. The use of alias is absorbed in plunder.
The Sandiganbayan issued a joint resolution granting Estrada's demurrer to evidence. The Sandiganbayan found that the People failed to present evidence that Estrada committed the crime punished under Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act No. 6085, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ursua v. Court of Appeals. It ruled that there is an illegal use of alias within the context of CA 142 only if the use of the alias is public and habitual.
Issue: Was the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias Jose Velarde public?
Held: The Supreme Court, citing the earlier case of Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, defined an “alias” as:
To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public who had no access to Estradas privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired in Malacaan where he sat as President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at that time. The same holds true for Estradas alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of Estradas representations to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.
The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests, affords Estrada a reasonable expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act related to the opening of a trust account a transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely confidential in nature.
Bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy. Given the private nature of Estradas act of signing the documents as Jose Velarde related to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim that there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. We need not even consider here the impact of the obligations imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the bank officers; what is essentially significant is the privacy situation that is necessarily implied in these kinds of transactions. This statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction was done publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly." (People vs Estrada, G.R. Nos. 164368-69, April 2, 2009)
Held: The Supreme Court, citing the earlier case of Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, defined an “alias” as:
a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. There must be, in the words of Ursua, a sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name (the alias) in addition to his real name from that day forth [for the use of alias to] fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.The required publicity in the use of alias is more than mere communication to a third person; the use of the alias, to be considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to cause it to become generally known. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that other name. In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest.
To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public who had no access to Estradas privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired in Malacaan where he sat as President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at that time. The same holds true for Estradas alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of Estradas representations to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.
The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests, affords Estrada a reasonable expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act related to the opening of a trust account a transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely confidential in nature.
Bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy. Given the private nature of Estradas act of signing the documents as Jose Velarde related to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim that there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. We need not even consider here the impact of the obligations imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the bank officers; what is essentially significant is the privacy situation that is necessarily implied in these kinds of transactions. This statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction was done publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly." (People vs Estrada, G.R. Nos. 164368-69, April 2, 2009)
An alias is a name that is different from the individual’s true name, and does not refer to a name that is not different from his true name
Facts: Limson filed a case for falsification against Eugenio Juan Gonzalez. Limson asserted that in the records of the Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC), a certain ‘EUGENIO GONZALEZ’ is registered as an architect and that Gonzalez, who uses, among others, the name ‘EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ’, pretends to be said architect. Gonzalez is an impostor and therefore, guilty of falsification.
Gonzalez filed his Counter–Affidavit, wherein he explained in detail that his full name is EUGENIO JUAN GONZALES y REGALADO. He alleges that in grade school and high school, he used the name EUGENIO GONZALEZ y REGALADO and/or EUGENIO GONZALEZ but when he transferred to the University of Sto. Tomas and took up Architecture, he made use of his second name, JUAN after EUGENIO. After he passed the board exam, he made use as much as possible the name Arch. Eugenio Juan Gonzalez, because the surname GONZALEZ was and is still, a very common surname throughout the Philippines and he wanted to distinguish himself.
After weighing the evidence, the investigating prosecutor dismissed the case. Limson appealed to the Secretary of Justice who affirmed the findings of the prosecutor.
Limson then filed a new letter complaint against Gonzalez with the Secretary of Justice, alleging the same accusations, this time for violation of the Anti-Alias Law. The DOJ referred to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City and docketed as a new case. Even so, the Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the new case.
When her case met the same fate, Limson again filed a petition for review with the DOJ, which again denied her petition. The CA affirmed the decision of the DOJ.
In her petition for review on certiorari filed with the Supreme Court, Limson insists that the names “Eugenio Gonzalez” and “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado” did not refer to one and the same individual; and that respondent Gonzalez was not a registered architect contrary to his claim. According to her, there were material discrepancies between the graduation photograph of respondent taken in 1941 when he earned his degree in Architecture from the University of Sto. Tomas, Manila, and another photograph of him taken for his driver’s license in 1996, arguing that the person in the latter photograph was not the same individual depicted in the 1941 photograph. She submits documents showing that respondent used aliases from birth, and passed himself off as such persons when in fact he was not.
Held: The Supreme Court held that it is not a trier of facts, and cannot analyze and weigh evidence.
It also held that Limson did not persuasively demonstrate to the CA how the Secretary of Justice had been gravely wrong in upholding the dismissal by the OCP of her charges against respondent. In contrast, the assailed resolutions of the Secretary of Justice were quite exhaustive in their exposition of the reasons for the dismissal of the charges. And, even assuming that the Secretary of Justice thereby erred, she should have shown to the CA that either arbitrariness or capriciousness or whimsicality had tainted the error. Yet, she tendered no such showing. She should be reminded, indeed, that grave abuse of discretion meant either that the judicial or quasi–judicial power was exercised by the Secretary of Justice in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the Secretary of Justice evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when the Secretary of Justice, while exercising judicial or quasi–judicial powers, acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
On the issue of the alleged use of illegal aliases, the court held that respondent’s aliases involved the names “Eugenio Gonzalez”, “Eugenio Gonzales”, “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez”, “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado”, “Eugenio C.R. Gonzalez”, “Eugenio J. Gonzalez”, and – per Limson – “Eugenio Juan Robles Gonzalez.” But these names contained his true names, albeit at times joined with an erroneous middle or second name, or a misspelled family name in one instance. The records disclose that the erroneous middle or second names, or the misspelling of the family name resulted from error or inadvertence left unchecked and unrectified over time. What is significant, however, is that such names were not fictitious names within the purview of the Anti–Alias Law; and that such names were not different from each other. Considering that he was not also shown to have used the names for unscrupulous purposes, or to deceive or confuse the public, the dismissal of the charge against him was justified in fact and in law.
It also held that Limson did not persuasively demonstrate to the CA how the Secretary of Justice had been gravely wrong in upholding the dismissal by the OCP of her charges against respondent. In contrast, the assailed resolutions of the Secretary of Justice were quite exhaustive in their exposition of the reasons for the dismissal of the charges. And, even assuming that the Secretary of Justice thereby erred, she should have shown to the CA that either arbitrariness or capriciousness or whimsicality had tainted the error. Yet, she tendered no such showing. She should be reminded, indeed, that grave abuse of discretion meant either that the judicial or quasi–judicial power was exercised by the Secretary of Justice in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the Secretary of Justice evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when the Secretary of Justice, while exercising judicial or quasi–judicial powers, acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
On the issue of the alleged use of illegal aliases, the court held that respondent’s aliases involved the names “Eugenio Gonzalez”, “Eugenio Gonzales”, “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez”, “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado”, “Eugenio C.R. Gonzalez”, “Eugenio J. Gonzalez”, and – per Limson – “Eugenio Juan Robles Gonzalez.” But these names contained his true names, albeit at times joined with an erroneous middle or second name, or a misspelled family name in one instance. The records disclose that the erroneous middle or second names, or the misspelling of the family name resulted from error or inadvertence left unchecked and unrectified over time. What is significant, however, is that such names were not fictitious names within the purview of the Anti–Alias Law; and that such names were not different from each other. Considering that he was not also shown to have used the names for unscrupulous purposes, or to deceive or confuse the public, the dismissal of the charge against him was justified in fact and in law.
An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually, usually in business transactions, in addition to the real name by which he was registered at birth or baptized the first time, or to the substitute name authorized by a competent authority; a man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him, but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. An alias is thus a name that is different from the individual’s true name, and does not refer to a name that is not different from his true name." (Limson vs. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 162205, March 31, 2014)
Use of fictitious name in a single transaction without intending to be known by this name in addition to his real name, not a violation of anti-alias law
Facts:
In 1989, Cesario Ursua was charged with bribery. His lawyer asked him to get a copy of the complaint against him from the Office of the Ombudsman since the law firm’s messenger, a certain Oscar Perez, was not available.
Before going to the Ombudsman, Ursua talked to Perez and told him that he is reluctant to ask for a copy of the complaint because he is the respondent in the said case. Perez then told him than he can just sign as “Oscar Perez” so that he does not have to reveal his true identity.
At the Office of the Ombudsman, Ursua signed the logbook there as “Oscar Perez”. When he was handed a copy of the complaint by Loida Kahulugan, he signed the receipt as “Oscar Perez”.
Before he could leave the premises, Ursua was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo who also works in the same office. When Loida learned that he was in fact Cesario Ursua, she recommended that a criminal case be filed against Ursua. Eventually, Ursua was sentenced to three years in prison for violating C.A. No. 142, as amended, otherwise known as “An Act To Regulate The Use Of Aliases”.
Issue: Was Cesario Ursua’s conviction proper?
Held: No. Ursua should be acquitted.
"An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A mans name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as Oscar Perez, which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that Oscar Perez is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name Oscar Perez was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused.
Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers."(Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112170, April 10, 1996)
Note: In short, the evils sought to be avoided by the C.A. No. 142 was not brought about when Ursua used a name other than his name. A strict application of the law is not warranted. When Ursua used the name of Oscar Perez, no fraud was committed; there was no crime committed punishable under C.A. No. 142. The purpose of the law is to punish evils defined therein so when no such evil was produced by Ursua’s act, said law need not be applied. - http://www.uberdigests.info
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