The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be "proper and reasonable cause" for which the change is sought."

Facts: Cynthia Vicencio was born to spouses Pablo and Fe Esperanza. After a marital spat, Pablo left the conjugal abode and never to return. It was then that Ernesto Yu came to the aid of Fe Esperanza. The marriage between Pablo and Fe was later dissolved and Fe married Ernesto. Cynthia grew up not knowing her real father, but treated Ernesto Yu as her father. Thus to avoid confusion arising from her different name, Cynthia filed a petition for change of surname from Vicencio to Yu. She averred that she consulted her step-father about the petition, and the latter consented to it. The Solicitor General opposed the petition. However, the trial court granted the petition. It ratiocinated by saying that since Ernesto cannot be compelled to adopt Cynthia to change her name from Vicencio to Yu, there is nor reason she cannot be allowed to change her name from Vicencio to Yu. 

The appellate court affirmed the decision, which held that it is for the best interest of petitioner that her surname be changed. The appellate court took into account the testimonies of private respondent and her witnesses that allowing the change of surname would "give her an opportunity to improve her personality and welfare."

Issue: Whether Cynthia can have her surname changed from Vicencio to Yu.

Held: The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be "proper and reasonable cause" for which the change is sought." The assailed decision as affirmed by the appellate court does not persuade us to depart from the applicability of the general rule on the use of surnames, specifically the law which requires that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father.

Private respondent Cynthia Vicencio is the legitimate offspring of Fe Leabres and Pablo Vicencio. As previously stated, a legitimate child generally bears the surname of his or her father. It must be stressed that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown.

Confusion indeed might arise with regard to private respondent's parentage because of her surname. But even, more confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if we allow private respondent to bear her step-father's surname, even if she is not legally adopted by him. While previous decisions have allowed children to bear the surname of their respective step-fathers even without the benefit of adoption, these instances should be distinguished from the present case. In Calderon vs. Republic, and Llaneta vs. Agrava, this Court allowed the concerned child to adopt the surname of the step-father, but unlike the situation in the present case where private respondent is a legitimate child, in those cases the children were not of legitimate parentage. In Moore vs. Republic, where the circumstances appears to be similar to the present case before us, the Court upheld the Republic's position:

We find tenable this observation of government's counsel. Indeed, if a child born out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of the mother, should the first husband die or be separated by a decree of divorce, there may result a confusion as to his real paternity. In the long run the change may redound to the prejudice of the child in the community.

While the purpose which may have animated petitioner is plausible and may run along the feeling of cordiality and spiritual relationship that pervades among the members of the Moore family, our hand is deferred by a legal barrier which we cannot at present overlook or brush aside. 

Similarly in Padilla vs. Republic, the Court ruled that:

To allow said minors to adopt the surname of their mother's second husband, who is not their father, could result in confusion in their paternity. It could also create the suspicion that said minors, who were born during the coverture of their mother with her first husband, were in fact sired by Edward Padilla, thus bringing their legitimate status into discredit. 

Private respondent might sincerely wish to be in a position similar to that of her step-father's legitimate children, a plausible reason the petition for change of name was filed in the first place. Moreover, it is laudable that Ernesto Yu has treated Cynthia as his very own daughter, providing for all her needs as a father would his own flesh and blood. However, legal constraints lead us to reject private respondent's desire to use her stepfather's surname. Further, there is no assurance the end result would not be even more detrimental to her person, for instead of bringing a stop to questions, the very change of name, if granted, could trigger much deeper inquiries regarding her parentage. (Republic vs. CA, G.R. No. 88202, December 14, 1998). 

When may children be allowed to use the surname of their step-fathers even without the benefit of adoption

The principle that disallows change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general.

Facts: Atanacia Llaneta was married with Serafin Ferrer whom she had a child named Victoriano Ferrer. Serafin died and about four years later Atanacia had a relationship with another man out of which Teresita Llaneta, herein petitioner, was born. All of them lived with Serafin’s mother in Manila. Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrer’s using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings throughout her schooling. When she was 21 years old, she applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Sorsogon as it is required to be presented in connection with a scholarship grant. It was then that she discovered that her registered surname was Llaneta and that she was the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father.  

She then filed a petition for change of name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer on the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta, instead of Ferrer, which she had been using, would cause untold difficulties and confusion. 

Serafin Ferrer's widowed mother, Victoria, and his two remaining brothers, Nehemias and Ruben, have come forward in earnest support of the petition. The petition was published without eliciting the slightest opposition from the relatives and friends of the late Serafin Ferrer. The State (represented by the Solicitor General's Office), likewise interposed no opposition at the trial after a searching cross-examination, of Teresita and her witnesses.

After trial, the respondent judge denied the petition on the ground that the change of name would give the false impression that Teresita is a legitimate daughter of Serafin.

Issue: Whether Teresita can have her surname changed to Ferrer.

Held: Teresita has established that she has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember. A sudden shift at this time by Teresita to the name Teresita Llaneta in order to conform to that appearing in her birth certificate would result in confusion among the persons and entities she deals with and entail endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of her new surname.

The principle that disallows change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship, relied by the respondent judge, remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general. (Llaneta vs Agrava, GR No. 32054, May 15, 1974). 

Note: The court granted the petition because Teresita was an illegitimate child. In the case of Republic vs. CA, G.R. No. 88202, December 14, 1998, the court denied the petition because the petitioner was a legitimate child. The law requires that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father.

A married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband

Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames. In the case of a married woman, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) her maiden first name and surname and add her husbands surname, or

(2) her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or

(3) her husbands full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as mrs.

We agree with petitioner that the use of the word may in the above provision indicates that the use of the husbands surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory. Clearly, a married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the three names provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. Further, this interpretation is in consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent. [Ma. Virginia V. Remo vs. The Honorable Secretary of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202, March 5, 2010]

See Remo vs Sec. of Foreign Affairs case digest

Can a married woman revert to the use of her maiden name?

For passport issuance purposes, a married woman whose marriage subsists, may not change her family name at will.

Facts: Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen. Being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following entries appear in her passport: “Rallonza” as her surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name, and “Remo” as her middle name. She applied for her passport’s renewal with the DFA office in Chicago, Illinois, USA with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. The DFA refused to grant Virginia’s petition on the basis of RA 8239 (the law on the issuance of passports). According to the DFA, Section 5(d) of the said law “limits the instances when a married woman may be allowed to revert to the use of her maiden name in her passport. These instances are death of husband, divorce decree, annulment or nullity of marriage. None of these conditions is present in Remo’s case, the DFA said. 

Remo appealed contending that when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status so she can still use her maiden name. In fact article 370 of the Civil Code uses the word “may” in enumerating the ways of using her husband’s surname. In said article she may use her maiden first name and surname and add her husband’s surname, or her maiden first name and husband’ surname, or her husband’s full name but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as “Mrs”. This provision is merely permissive but not obligatory. But RA 8239 prohibiting her to revert to her maiden name in the replacement passport conflicts with, and, thus operate as an implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code. Was Remo correct?

Held: There is no conflict between Article 370 of the Civil Code and Section 5 (d) RA 8239. RA 8239 and its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married women from using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the DFA allows a married woman who applies for a passport to use her maiden name. However once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name except in cases of (1) death of the husband, (2) divorce (3) annulment, or (4) declaration of nullity of marriage. Since Remo’s marriage subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport.

Even assuming there is a conflict, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the general provisions of the Civil Code on the use of surnames. A special law prevails over a general law.

Moreover, well entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. The apparently conflicting provisions of two laws should be harmonized as much as possible, so that each shall be effective. For a law to repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent and repugnant as to be irreconcilable. Remo failed to establish this fact.

Remo would not have encountered any problems in the replacement passport had she opted to continuously and consistently use her maiden name from the moment she was married and from the time she first applied for a Philippine passport. However, she consciously chose to use her husbands surname before, in her previous passport application, and now desires to resume her maiden name. If this is allowed, nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the use of her husbands surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport, which is considered superior to all other official documents, cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise. [Ma. Virginia V. Remo vs. The Honorable Secretary of Foreign Affairs,” G.R. No. 169202, March 5, 2010]

Even after the legal separation, wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation

May a wife resume using her maiden name after a legal separation has been decreed?

Facts: After Elisea L. Santamaria was decreed legally separated from her husband Enrique R. Santamaria, Elisea filed a petition praying that she be allowed to resume using her maiden name Elisea LAPERAL. The trial court denied the petition for the reason that Article 372 of the Civil Code requires the wife, even after she is decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using the name and surname she employed before the legal separation. Upon Elisea's motion, however, the court, treating the petition as one for change of name, reconsidered its decision and granted the petition on the ground that to allow petitioner, who is a businesswoman decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. Hence, the state appealed.

Held: Article 372 of the Civil Code reads:

ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation.

The language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the legal separation has been decreed, shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. This is so because her married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be the policy of the law that the wife should continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned. 

Even applying Rule 103 (which refers to change of name in general), the fact of legal separation alone — which is the only basis for the petition — is, not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be to provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of Article 372.

The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis.  It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. [Laperal vs. Republic, GR No. L-18008, October 30, 1962]